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The court distinguished the case sub
judice from Jensen, supra. Jensen involved
the loss of control of an automobile allegedly due to a defect in the steering
mechanism where the only evidence produced was the plaintiffs' testimony that
he heard the tires squeal. The court stated
that the plaintiffs in Jensen failed to negate other causes of the accident.
In the area of products liability, involving the theories of strict liability and implied warranty of merchantibility, the
holding in this case has the potential to
provide a "windfall" to plaintiffs. The
practical effect of the decision will be to
shift the essential burden of proof to the
defendant. As it stands now, the plaintiff
is required to testify that he bought the
product and that he did not misuse or
alter the product, thus, effectively shifting to the defendant the burden of proving that the causal effect of the accident
was not produced by the defendant.
The decision has further eroded the rule
of caveat emptor. With regard to strict
liability, it now appears that in order to
reach the jury, who most often will side
with the injured plaintiff, evidence of an
accident which injured the plaintiff is
needed; coupled with the plaintiff's heartfelt assurances that he did not misuse,
alter or even touch the product (i.e., "all
of a sudden, it just blew up") will be sufficient proof. This case takes the position
that a plaintiff's testimony will not be
self-serving. It may be too much to ask of
an injured party.
- Kevin L. Beard

New Hampshire v. Piper: OPENS
DOORS TO BAR ADMISSION
In Supreme Court of New Hampshire v.
Piper, 105 S.Ct. 1272 (1985), the United
States Supreme Court held that New
Hampshire Supreme Court Rule 42,
which limits bar admission to state residents, violated the privileges and immunities clause of the United States Constitution, article IV, section 2, clause 1. By this
ruling, the Court has affected the residency
requirements for lawyers in at least twentyseven states. Low, Lawyer Residency Requirement Axed by Supreme Court, The
Daily Record, Mar. 12, 1985 at 4, col. 3.
However, Maryland is not one of the states
affected by this ruling. See, e.g., Rule 10 of
Rules Governing Admission to the Bar of
Maryland (deleted Jan. 22, 1982).
In Piper, the appellee, Kathryn Piper, a
resident of a town in Vermont, which was
located about 400 yards from the New
Hampshire border, passed the New Hampshire bar examination in 1980. She was in26- The Law Forum/Fal~ 1985

formed by the New Hampshire Board of
Bar Examiners, however, that before she
could practice law in the state of New
Hampshire she would have to become a
resident of New Hampshire pursuant to
New Hampshire Supreme Court Rule 42.
Appellee requested from the Clerk of the
New Hampshire Supreme Court a dispensation from the residency requirement, explaining that her personal situation negated the convenience of becoming a New
Hampshire resident. The Clerk denied
appellee's request. Piper than petitioned
the New Hampshire Supreme Court for
permission to become a member of the
bar. The New Hampshire Supreme Court
denied her request. The appellee filed the
present action in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. The court ruled in 1982 that the
New Hampshire residency requirement
violated the privileges and immunities
clause. New Hampshire v. Piper, 539 F.
Supp. 1064 (D.N.H. 1982). The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the
ruling. New Hampshire v. Piper, 723 F.2d
110 (1st Cir. 1983).
The Court in Piper begins by discussing
the intent of the privileges and immunities
clause. The clause, according to the Court,
was intended to "fuse into one Nation
a collection of independent, sovereign
States." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385,
395 (1948). Consequently, it is "[0Jnly with
respect to those 'privileges' and 'immunities' bearing on the vitality of the nation as
a single entity that a State must accord residents and nonresidents equal treatment."
Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n,
436 U.S. 371,383 (1978). Therefore, the
privileges and immunities clause only protects fundamental rights.

The Court determined that practicing
law is a fundamental right protected by
that clause. First, one of the purposes of
the clause is "to create a national economic
union." Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1276. Since
"the practice oflaw is important to the national economy," it is a fundamental right
which is protected. Piper, 105 S.Ct. at
1277. Second, the practice oflaw is a fundamental right because in cases where "unpopular federal claims" are raised "representation by nonresident counsel may be
the only means available for the vindication offederal rights." Piper, 105 S.Ct. at
1277.
In addition, the Court noted that the
practice oflaw does not involve an exercise
of state power as in In re Gnffiths, 413
U.S. 717 (1973), justifying a residency
requirement. Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1278. Instead, a lawyer is a private businessman
and not "an 'officer' of the State in any political sense." Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1278.
Although the Court determined that
practicing law is a fundamental right, the
state can still discriminate against nonresidents where: "(i) there is a substantial
reason for the difference in treatment; and
(ii) the discrimination practiced against
nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the State's objective." Piper, 105
S.Ct. at 1279. The Court determined, however, that New Hampshire did not show
substantial reasons that were substantially
related to the state's objective to discriminate against nonresident attorneys. First,
"[tJhere is no evidence to support the State's
claim that nonresidents might be less likely
to keep abreast of local rules and procedures." Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1279. Second,
"there is no reason to believe that a nonresident lawyer will conduct his practice

in a dishonest manner. The nonresident
lawyer's professional duty and interest in
his reputation should provide the same incentive to maintain high ethical standards
as they do for resident lawyers." Piper, 105
S.Ct. at 1279. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire "has the authority to discipline all members of the bar, regardless of where they reside." Piper, 105
S.Ct. at 1279. Third, the argument that a
nonresident attorney will not be available
for court proceedings is unsound because
in those cases where the nonresident
counsel will be unavailable on short
notice, the State can protect its interests through less restrictive means. The
trial court, by rule or as an exercise of
discretion, may require any lawyer who
resides at a great distance to retain a
local attorney who will be available for
unscheduled meetings and hearings.
Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1280.
Fourth, the contention that nonresident
lawyers will not "do their share ofpro bono
and volunteer work" is not necessarily
true. Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1280. A nonresident lawyer could be "required to represent indigents and perhaps to participate
in formal legal-aid work." Piper, 105 S.Ct.
at 1280.
Justice Rehnquist dissented in Piper, arguing that there are substantial reasons
why a state would discriminate against
nonresident lawyers. First,
the State has a substantial interest in
creating its own set oflaws responsive
to its own local interests, and it is reasonable for a State to decide that those
people who have been trained to analyze law and policy are better equipped
to write those state laws and adjudicate
cases arising under them. The State
therefore may decide that it has an interest in maximizing the number of
resident lawyers, so as to increase the
quality of the pool from which its lawmakers can be drawn.
Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1283.
Second, since lawyers play an important
role in the formation of state policy, "they
should be intimately conversant with the
local concerns that should inform such
policies." Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1283. Third,
the state may have an interest in having
resident attorneys "bring their useful expertise to other important functions that
benefit from such expertise and are of interest to state governments-such as trusteeships, or directorships ofcorporations or
charitable organizations, or school board
positions, or merely the role of the interested citizen at a town meeting." Piper,
105 S.Ct. at 1283. Fourth, a state does

have a substantial interest in assuring that
there not be a delay in litigation due to
nonresident lawyers. Piper, 105 S.Ct. at
1285.
The Court in Piper has promulgated a
rule which will cause the amendment of, if
not the abolition of, residency requirements for lawyers in at least twenty-seven
states. The fears of Justice Rehnquist,
however, do not seem to be sound. Nonresident lawyers have represented clients,
with the permission of the courts, on a pro
hac vice basis for years. By allowing attorneys to practice on a regional or national
level, this ruling will permit the public to
have a freer hand in selecting competent
legal counsel.

-Sam Piazza
California v. Carney: A MAN'S
MOBILE HOME IS NOT
HIS CASTLE
In Calzjornia v. Carney, 105 S.Ct. 2066
(1985), the Supreme Court of the United
States held that federal narcotics agents
did not violate the fourth amendment
when they conducted a warrantless search
based on probable cause of a mobile home
parked in a public parking lot. In so doing,
the Court, for the first time applied the
"automobile exception" to a fully mobile
motor home.
Federal narcotics agents had reason to
believe that Carney was exchanging marijuana for sex in a motor home parked in a
lot in downtown San Diego. The defendant
was observed downtown as he approached
a youth and accompanied him back to the
motor home. When the youth emerged he
was stopped by the agents who then learned
that he had received marijuana in return
for allowing Carney sexual contacts. The
officers persuaded the youth to return to
the motor home and knock on the door.
When Carney stepped out the agents identified themselves and without a warrant or
consent, one agent entered and observed
marijuana and drug paraphernalia. A subsequent search of the motor home at the
police station revealed additional marijuana.
After unsuccessful attempts to have the
evidence discovered in the motor home
suppressed, the defendant pleaded nolo
contendre to possession of marijuana for
sale. The California Court of Appeal affirmed (People v. Carney, 117 Cal. App.
3d 36, 172 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1981)), but the
California Supreme Court reversed People
v. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d 597,194 Cal. Rptr.
500, 668 P.2d 807 (1983), holding the
"automobile exception" inapplicable to a
motor home.

Chief Justice Burger, author of the
Court's opinion, began by reviewing the
"automobile exception" to the general rule
that a warrant must be secured before a
search is undertaken. Carney, 105 S.Ct.
at 2068. This exception to the warrant requirement had its genesis in Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The
Court justified the lesser degree of protection of privacy interests in an automobile
by relying principally on the ready mobility of the automobile.
"However, although ready mobility
alone was perhaps the original justification
for the vehicle exception, our later cases
have made clear that ready mobility is not
the only basis for the exception." Carney,
105 S.Ct. at 2069. Because one has a lesser
expectation of privacy in one's automobile
than one's home, the warrant requirement
is relaxed notwithstanding the mobility of
the vehicle. Cady v. Dombrowskl~ 413 U.S.

433 (1973). "These reduced expectations
of privacy derive not from the fact that the
area to be searched is in plain view, but
from the pervasive regulation of vehicles
capable of traveling on the public highways." Carney, 105 S.Ct. at 2069.
The Court was now forced to characterize the motor home as either an automobile or a home. "While it is true that the
[defendant's] vehicle possessed some, if
not many of the attributes of a home, it is
equally clear that the vehicle falls clearly
within the exception laid down in Carroll . .. " Carney, 105 S.Ct. at 2070. The
Chief Justice noted that the motor home
was readily mobile and subject to extensive regulation-the two justifications underlying the "automobile exception."
However, the Chief Justice made a third
observation; "the vehicle was so situated
that an objective observer would conclude
that it was being used not as a residence,
but as a vehicle." Id. at 2070. This may
Fal~
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